Anger, Agency and Action in Black and White:
Racial Efficacy, Emotion & Political Behavior

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Abstract

This paper explores the role of racial group efficacy in shaping the emotions and political behavior of Black and White Americans. Drawing on data from a nationally representative survey and an original survey experiment, we show significant variations in how Black and White people view their political influence as individuals and as members of collective racial groups. We uncover patterns that question whether the linkage between efficacy and anger as demonstrated by extant scholarship is effectively applicable to African Americans. Finally, we show that racial group efficacy is a stronger predictor of political behavior than conventional efficacy measures—particularly for African Americans. We discuss how a focus on racial group efficacy can greatly inform our understanding of racial divergences in political participation.

Key words: race, efficacy (internal, external and racial), emotion, anger, pride, agency, appraisal theory, political behavior

Introduction

An abundance of scholarship on emotions in politics appears to corroborate a particular conventional wisdom. If you want to get people more active in politics, get them *mad as hell*. This work often posits that the pathway linking the emotion state of anger to greater propensity to engage in costly political actions such as voting, donating to campaigns, contacting elected officials or participating in protests is a sense of agency (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings 2011).

This sense of agency is typically operationalized via the traditional measure of internal efficacy, which captures whether people feel they are individually capable of navigating the complexities of politics to act effectively. But we contend this measure is insufficient to capture the sense of agency that African Americans generally perceive when navigating politics. Because of the group-centric lens employed by many Black Americans to filter their view of politics, direct measures of their agency as members of a socially relevant group—as opposed to simply as individuals—should lend greater insight into the propensity of African Americans to generate a mobilizing anger in response to relevant political threats.

In this project, we test the relative utility of traditional measures of individual efficacy and measures of racial group efficacy across two studies—the 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS) and an original survey experiment, the Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study. Across both studies, we find three meaningful patterns. One, there are substantial differences in White and Black participants' perceptions of their efficacy as individuals, relative to their efficacy as respective racial groups. Two, perceptions of group efficacy seem less tethered to the emotion state of anger for African Americans relative to

Whites. Three, for African Americans in particular, collective efficacy is a more robust predictor of political participation than the traditional individual-level measures.

In the sections that follow, we lay out a theoretical foundation for understanding how perceptions of racial group efficacy-can inhibit the translation of anger to action among African Americans. We then describe the tests from the CMPS and RAP Study and lay out our attempts to identify how consideration of collective efficacy troubles conventional notions of the linkages between agency, anger and action. We close with brief discussion of the implications and questions arising from the trends uncovered from the CMPS and RAP studies.

Race and the Anger-Agency Linkage

Emotions encompass feelings, physiological changes and psychological responses, which together motivate particular behaviors in reaction to specific stimuli (Halperin, Sharvit and Gross (2011). Seminal work by Frijda (1986) identifies more than a dozen discrete emotions that motivate distinct types of behaviors. Emotions, therefore, can play critical roles in informing individuals' political behavior across varying contexts.

The emotion state of anger, defined as a feeling of belligerence over a perceived slight or injustice, tends to correspond with more proactive and direct behaviors. When feeling angry, individuals rely more strongly on their predispositions, become less risk averse, and experience increased motivation to right what they perceive to be the slight or unjust threat (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000). Due to these tendencies, research finds individuals expressing anger over perceived political threats to be more likely to take on costly political actions such as voting and campaigning, relative to those expressing fear over such threats (Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings 2011).

Appraisal theory draws a through line that connects an individual's engendering of anger in response to threats in the political environment to her sense of political efficacy. This theory asserts that individuals' emotional responses to phenomena are rooted in their cognitive evaluations regarding how that phenomena will advance or hinder their progress toward their goals (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Scherer, Schorr and Johnstone 2001). When encountering a threat, an individual's appraisal of the resources at her disposal to counteract that threat determines whether her emotional response will be one of anger or anxiety.

Past work utilizes the measure of internal efficacy—operationalized as disagreement with the statement *sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on*—as an indicator of one's appraisal of her capacity to counteract political threats (e.g. Valentino et al. 2009). Those who express greater internal efficacy are more likely to exhibit anger rather than anxiety over the prospective threat of an un-favored political outcome. This anger in turn is associated with increased political action to stave off the outcome.

People do not simply appraise their influence within a given political environment as individuals. They also make appraisals of the influence of their social identity groups within the environment. Accordingly, people can generate group-based emotional responses to political threats that are distinct from what they would feel as individuals (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, and Drori 2008). The group-based emotions are rooted both in individuals' perceptions of their group's collective capacity to affect change, and their senses of closeness to and solidarity with the group.

Past research provides evidence both of aggrieved groups increasing their action in the face of threats (Tajfel 1978; Walker and Mann 1987), and aggrieved groups being demobilized

when encountering threats (Martin, Brickman and Murray 1984; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink and Mielke 1999). Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach (2004) summarize work by Folger (1987) and Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo (1997) as indicating that when aggrieved groups perceive their marginalized status as unlikely to improve, they respond with a debilitating resentment rather than a mobilizing anger. Further, work by van Zomeren et al (2004) and Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano (1999) indicates that group members' perceptions of whether their group suffers collective disadvantage and the procedural fairness of governing institutions influence whether their emotional response to threat cues will be one of anger or anxiety.

These studies indicate the importance of individuals' perceptions of their group's political efficacy in shaping their group-based emotional responses to political threats. Indeed, as a review by Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears (2012) makes clear, an abundance of literature from social psychology illustrates that people's engagement in collective action to advance their group's sociopolitical standing is contingent on their beliefs that change is possible through unified action (see for example Hornsey et al 2009; Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam 1990).

Due to the strong senses of racial in-group solidarity exhibited by African Americans (Dawson 1994; McClain, Carew, Walton Jr and Watts 2009; Simien 2005), group-based emotions should be especially impactful for the group's political behavior. Yet the pervasive belief among group members that African Americans are collectively disadvantaged or marginalized within politics should depress Black individual perceptions of group efficacy. The lower levels of trust in government, confidence in the fairness of political institutions and general satisfaction with politics relative to White people (Aberbach and Walker 1969; Avery 2006; Dawson 2011: Nunnally 2012; Pierce and Carey Jr. 1971) all point to Black people perceiving less collective agency within politics. This should in turn inhibit expressions of anger from

African Americans in contexts of political threat, which subsequently constrains the political activeness of the group in those contexts of threat. To adequately test this claim requires a different approach to thinking about and operationalizing individuals' senses of efficacy.

Operationalizing the agency, anger and action linkage across race

Because perceptions of group efficacy are distinct from perceptions of individual efficacy, the measures of both internal and external efficacy traditionally employed in studies of political behavior likely prove insufficient to adequately capture variations in how racial groups appraise their collective capacity to influence politics. Political behavior studies often tout the previously described measure of internal efficacy as a more effective predictor of participation than the measure of external efficacy—typically operationalized as agreement or disagreement with the statement: *people like me have a say in how government handles important issues*. We contend, however, that a measure of an individual's perception of government responsiveness to her input should be quite predictive of her participation—especially when that individual carries one or more salient identities that she perceives to be marginalized within a stratified sociopolitical system. Perhaps the null influence of the conventional external efficacy measure reflects a lack of conceptual clarity in its construction.

In fact, both of these measures rely on an a conceptually amorphous identity construct that can plausibly vary from one temporal or political context to the next. Just who does the individual consider to be "people like me" in the moment she is asked these questions? Members of her family? Neighbors? Co-workers? Members of her racial group? Gender? Religious affiliation?

By adding revised versions of the traditional external efficacy question, we can accomplish a number of goals. We capture more precisely individuals' perceptions of the

influence generally carried by their racial group in politics, allowing us to draw direct contrasts between their assessments of their political influence as individuals and as collective racial groups. Additionally, we can assess whether traditional indicators of efficacy or the explicitly racial indicators are more predictive of individuals' emotional and behavioral responses to political phenomena.

Across two national datasets (described in detail in the next section) we asked three questions intended to be indicators of individuals' appraisals of their racial groups' influence in politics. We consider these to be measures of racial group efficacy:

How often would you say [Black people/White people] have a say in how government handles important issues?[1][2]

How often would you say public officials work hard to help [Black/White people]?

How often would you say [Black/White people] elected to office can make changes for people in your racial group?

When assessing responses to these questions across racial groups, we expect to find the following patterns. African Americans will exhibit significantly less racial efficacy than their White counterparts. The lowered racial efficacy expressed by African Americans will be associated with either (1) a weaker emergence of anger in response to political threats or (2) a weaker translation from anger to action for African Americans. Finally, we expect to find that expressions of racial group efficacy among African Americans carry a stronger impact on their political behavior than the traditional measures of efficacy.

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[1] We intentionally shifted the framing of the question from agree/disagree to a frequency scale to reduce acquiescence bias, and to attain greater clarity in interpreting the distinction between response categories. For example, We find it easier to infer the difference between someone who says her racial group *never* has a say and someone who says their group *sometimes* has a say in government, as opposed to someone who *strongly disagrees* that their racial group has say versus someone who *somewhat disagrees*.

[2] Within this paper, we focus exclusively on responses to this first racial efficacy measure, in part because it offers a direct comparison to the traditional external efficacy measure.

Two of these expectations are borne out. African Americans indeed exhibit less racial

group efficacy, both relative to the efficacy they report as individuals and relative to reports of

racial group efficacy by Whites. And reported racial group efficacy generally appears to be a

stronger predictor of political behavior for both racial groups—but especially for African

Americans. Yet contrary to our expectations, we find only a tenuous link between racial group

efficacy and anger among Whites, while finding either no relationship or one a negative

relationship between group efficacy and anger among Black respondents.

Description of Data

2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)

The 2016 CMPS (Barreto, Frasure-Yokley, Vargas and Wong 2016) is a web

administered survey of 10,145 respondents, including vote registered, non-registered and non-

citizen individuals.[3] The CMPS utilized stratified listed and density quota-sampling approaches

to attain large samples of racial and ethnic minorities (Barreto, Frasure-Yokley, Vargas, and

Wong 2018). It contains 3,102 self-identified Black respondents and 1034 White respondents.

Survey data are weighted within each racial group to match the population of the 2015 Census

ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status.

The survey was conducted between December 2016 and February 2017. The CMPS does not

include the conventional external efficacy question; accordingly, we compare Black and White

reports on the classic internal efficacy measure and our racial efficacy measure.

2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study

We created this survey-embedded experiment and distributed it using the Qualtrics online

survey platform during a two-week period in January 2018. We attained a national sample of 472

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[3] Question wording available at: http://cmpsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2016_questionairre.pdf

Black and 473 White participants. The Qualtrics platform ensured the 945 participants contained parity across factors such as age, education level, region and partisanship. White participants skewed older and more politically conservative than black participants. Details on the sample are displayed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics on participants in the 2018 Race, Anger & Participation (RAP) Study

	BLACK	WHITE
Total observations	472	473
Average Age	35	51
% Women	54%	54%
% College Graduates	62%	61%
% Moderate/strong Republicans	14.3%	35.6%
% Moderate/Strong Democrats	27.1%	26.8%

Pre-treatment questions included measures of subjects' perceptions of their individual efficacy (including both the traditional internal and external efficacy measures), political trust and racial attitudes. The post-treatment measures included a battery of participation likelihood questions covering a wide range of prospective political actions, including expressing intent to attend a local town hall or policing forum, voting in the 2018 midterm elections, and providing financial support, volunteering time or writing social media posts in support of the major parties, activists organizations such as the movement for Black lives, and interest groups such as the Fraternal Order of Police. Our racial efficacy questions were also asked post-treatment.

The treatment took the form of an emotion induction exercise, similar in design to those employed by Banks (2014) and Banks and Valentino (2012). Subjects were asked to reflect on a past experience or instance that made them feel angry, and prompted to write in detail about that

experience. In addition to the written prompt, participants view a corresponding image of people vividly expressing anger. We created two distinct induction prompts, in order to determine whether Black and White participants differed in their experiences with varying dimensions of anger. RAP participants were randomly assigned to either a *political anger* condition, a *racial anger* condition, or a *control* condition.

Subjects in the political anger condition viewed an image of a mostly white crowd of angry constituents at a town hall meeting. Subjects in the racial anger condition viewed an image of African American protestors confronting police. Finally, subjects in the control condition viewed an image of an empty suitcase, and were prompted to write about what they would pack on a vacation. These subjects were not primed to feel any type of emotion, and thus served as the point of reference against which the political behaviors of participants in the emotion conditions were compared. The full text of the prompts and corresponding images across the treatments and control, in addition to the full text of the pre-and post-test questions, is available in the Appendix. Across both the CMPS and RAP studies, all variables are coded to range in value from zero to 1.

Findings

Comparing reports of individual and racial group efficacy

We first compared the mean responses of Black and White subjects to the conventional and racial group efficacy measures. Table 2 below presents comparisons of Black and White CMPS respondents on the measure of internal efficacy (*sometimes government and politics is too complicated for people like me*—recoded so that higher values indicate greater disagreement) and our measure of racial efficacy (*how often do [Black/White] people have a say in government*).

Table 2: Mean efficacy responses, across CMPS participant race

		Black (n=3154)	White (n=1014)	t-value	df
Internal efficacy	M	0.48	0.47	-1.38	4166
	SD	(0.30)	(0.29)		
Racial efficacy	M	0.37	0.57	**22.03*****	4166
	SD	(0.25)	(0.26)		

^ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Mean responses to the internal efficacy question are virtually equivalent across race. Yet, when asked to assess the influence of their respective racial groups, Black respondents report significantly less efficacy (p=0.000) than Whites. Also noteworthy are the substantial within group differences between expressed internal and racial efficacy. Black respondents' mean reported racial efficacy is eleven points lower than their mean internal efficacy. In contrast, White mean reports of racial efficacy are ten points higher than their reports of internal efficacy. Consistent with the extensive literature indicating that Black and White Americans carry vastly different perceptions of the responsiveness of the political environment to their interests, we find Black respondents exhibiting much less sanguine views of their collective political influence as a racial group.

Turning to the RAP Study, we continue to find stark differences in Black and White subjects' expressions of efficacy as individuals and as racial groups. Table 3 displays mean responses to the internal, external and racial group efficacy questions, across Black and White subjects.

Table 3: Mean responses to efficacy measures, across subject race

		Black (n=469)	White (n=471)	t-value	df
Individual Internal efficacy	M	0.42	0.50	-3.50***	942
	SD	(0.34)	(0.34)		
Individual External efficacy	M	0.59	0.47	-5.83***	938
	SD	(0.31)	(0.31)		
Racial efficacy	M	0.43	0.57	-7.56***	943
	SD	(0.33)	(0.28)		

^ p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In contrast to the CMPS, Black subjects in the RAP exhibit significantly less internal efficacy than White subjects (*p*=0.000). But, when the frame of reference is *people like them*, Black subjects report significantly *greater* external efficacy than their White counterparts (*p*=0.000). Yet as shown in the final column, when the reference group shifts from the nebulous "people like me" to people from one's racial group, the results are reversed. Black subjects now report significantly *less* efficacy than Whites (*p*=0.000). The magnitude difference of fourteen points in mean racial group efficacy between Black and White subjects is nearly double the magnitude difference of eight points in internal efficacy.

When considering their influence over important government issues without explicit reference to their race, Black subjects express a strong degree of political agency. But when primed to consider their influence not as individuals (or potentially any social identity other than race) but rather as a collective racial group, their sense of agency plummets. In contrast, White perceptions of agency appear to increase when their referent group shifts from "people like me" to their specific racial group.[4]

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[4] As will be discussed and displayed in Table 6, the difference in Black perceptions of individual and racial group efficacy is not driven by exposure the treatment effects. Black responses to the racial efficacy question do not vary

The distinction between Black subjects' appraisals of the political influence they wield as individuals and as a racial group comes into clearer view from identifying factors that influence reports of racial group efficacy but not individual efficacy. The RAP study includes pre-treatment questions intended to assess Black subjects' perceptions of the pervasiveness of racial discrimination, as well as their typical emotional disposition in response to that discrimination. Two of these questions take the form of agreement or disagreement with the following:

No matter how much racial progress is made, discrimination will always affect the lives of black people.

I feel a responsibility to my racial group to stay calm in the face of discrimination.

Figure 1 displays the distributions of Black subjects' responses to these questions. A full 81% agree strongly or somewhat that racial discrimination will always affect the lives of Black people. About 73% of Black subjects express agreement with the idea that they hold a responsibility to keep calm in the face of discrimination. Table 4 displays the main effects of each of these measures on Black subjects' reported external efficacy as a racial group and as individuals, respectively.

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significantly across the three conditions. Meanwhile, there is an observable treatment effect for White subjects in the *racial anger* condition.

Figure 1: Distribution of Black subject responses to discrimination measures

Table 4: Main effects of Black views on discrimination on reported efficacy measures

	Racial Efficacy	Individual Efficacy
Belief Discrimination Will Always Affect Black People	-0.98** (0.34)	0.35 (0.34)
Responsibility to Keep Calm In Face of Discrimination	1.47*** (0.33)	0.63^ (0.33)
N	471	468

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

As expected, Black individuals' views on the scope of racial discrimination and their response to it are more firmly tethered to their reported racial group efficacy than their efficacy as individuals. Believing that discrimination will always affect the lives of Black people is associated with lower reports of racial group efficacy (p=0.004), but it elicits no effect on individual efficacy (p=0.31). Belief in the responsibility to keep calm in the face of discrimination is strongly associated with greater racial group efficacy (p=0.000). This belief is also positively associated with individual efficacy, albeit less strongly. The magnitude effect size on Black subjects' individual efficacy is nearly half that for their group efficacy. And the effect is marginally significant (p=0.052).

These trends further indicate that African Americans view their collective influence as a racial group through a lens distinct from the one employed to assess their influence as individuals. White Americans also appear to make observable distinctions between their political efficacy as individuals and as a racial group. How do these distinct impressions of racial group influence shape (or constrain) the emergence of anger for these groups?

Assessing the linkages between racial group efficacy and emotion

Given the linkage made in social and political psychology between perceptions of political efficacy and the emotion state of anger, we expected to find that the disparity in racial group efficacy exhibited by African Americans manifests in the inhibition of an action-inducing anger among the group. Yet this is not the case, as evidenced by trends from both the CMPS and RAP Study.

Turning first to the CMPS, Table 5 displays the results of ordered logistic regressions predicting the effects of internal and racial group efficacy on Black and White subjects' reported anger felt over the course of the 2016 election, respectively. These regressions control for the

standard battery of demographic, resource and engagement variables typically included in

political behavior models.

Table 5: Ordered logit models. Predicting effects of internal and racial group efficacy on frequency of anger reported during 2016 election. Data from 2016 CMPS.

	WHITE	BLACK
Internal Efficacy	-0.36	-0.39**
	(0.24)	(0.14)
Collective Efficacy	-0.23	-0.90***
	(0.28)	(0.19)
Education	1.00***	0.37*
	(0.28)	(0.17)
Household Income	0.11	0.26
	(0.22)	(0.15)
Age	-0.28	-1.52***
	(0.40)	(0.27)
Woman	0.26	0.36***
	(0.14)	(0.09)
Party ID	0.96***	1.06***
	(0.19)	(0.16)
Church Attendance	-0.54**	-0.32**
	(0.18)	(0.10)
Interest in Politics	1.34***	1.04***
	(0.27)	(0.15)
Distrust in Government	1.68***	0.63***
	(0.33)	(0.18)
Belief Economy Worsened	0.11	0.08
	(0.22)	(0.13)
R2	0.05	0.04
N	839	2126

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Among White respondents, there is no discernible relationship between either the internal

efficacy measure (p=0.13) or the racial efficacy measure (p=0.41) and reported anger. This is

surprising in its own right. But among Black respondents, there is a significant and *negative* association between both forms of efficacy and reported anger. As Black respondents express greater efficacy as individuals ($p=0.005$) and as a collective racial group ($p=0.000$), they express significantly less anger over the election. Further, the magnitude of the effect size on racial efficacy is more than twice the size of that for the individual measure.

Because the racial group efficacy questions are asked after the treatment inductions in the RAP Study, I examined whether the treatments carry any discernible effects on Black and White subjects' expressions of racial group efficacy. Recall that the treatments consist of inductions priming anger either over politics in general or anger over racial issues. Given the aforementioned ties between the emotion state of anger, increased confidence, and less risk aversion, would being primed with anger make either group feel more racially agentic?

Table 6 below displays White and Black subjects' respective mean reports of racial group efficacy across the control and anger prime conditions.

Table 6: Treatment effects on mean reported racial group efficacy, across subject race

		POLITICAL ANGER					RACIAL ANGER			
		Con. n=156	Treat. n=163	t-value	df		Con. n=156	Treat. n=132	t-value	df
Black										
	M	0.42	0.44	-0.64	317	M	0.42	0.40	0.59	286
	SD	(0.34)	(0.30)			SD	(0.34)	(0.33)		
		Con. n=144	Treat. n=137	t-value	df		Con. n=144	Treat. n=158	t-value	df
White										
	M	0.54	0.58	-1.18	279	M	0.54	0.59	*-1.31^*	300
	SD	(0.28)	(0.27)			SD	(0.28)	(0.27)		

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Among African Americans, assignment to either the *political anger* ($p=0.74$) or *racial anger* ($p=0.72$) condition bears no effect on expressed racial group efficacy. Among White subjects,

however, assignment to the *racial anger* condition is associated with reporting a greater sense of racial group efficacy (*p*=0.09). Complementing the CMPS findings, this trend further indicates that the agency-anger linkage may indeed by notably weaker for African Americans than for Whites.

Taken together, this set of findings troubles the longstanding narrative linking perceptions of political efficacy to the emotion state of anger. If anger is the reserve of people who possess great confidence in their control over politics, then what are we to make of groups who generally do not feel such control? Further, what are we to make of the fact that when members of such groups *do* express this sense of control, it appears to be untethered to anger?

In addition to asking how often respondents felt angry over the course of the election, the CMPS also asks about fear, hope and pride felt during the election. Whereas African Americans exhibited a negative association between racial group efficacy and anger, they exhibit a strong and positive relationship between this collective efficacy measure and the emotion of pride. Table 7 displays the results of ordered logistic regressions predicting the effects of internal and racial group efficacy on Black and White subjects' reported pride felt over the course of the 2016 election, respectively.

Table 7: Ordered logit models predicting effects of internal and racial group efficacy on frequency of pride reported during 2016 election. Data from 2016 CMPS.

	WHITE	BLACK
Internal Efficacy	-0.22	0.03
	(0.25)	(0.15)
Collective Efficacy	0.18	**2.26***
	(0.28)	**(0.20)**
Education	-0.39	-0.36*
	(0.28)	(0.18)
Household Income	-0.72**	-0.08
	(0.23)	(0.15)

Age	2.55***	2.32***
	(0.41)	(0.29)
Woman	-0.31*	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.09)
Party ID	-1.04***	-0.01
	(0.19)	(0.17)
Church Attendance	0.35	0.20
	(0.18)	(0.11)
Interest in Politics	1.47***	1.00***
	(0.28)	(0.17)
Distrust in Government	-1.56***	-1.04***
	(0.34)	(0.19)
Belief Economy Worsened	-0.46*	-0.59***
	(0.23)	(0.14)
Pseudo R2	0.09	0.09
N	839	2126

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^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

White respondents exhibit null relationships between both reported internal efficacy ($p=0.37$) and racial group efficacy ($p=0.53$) and reported pride. Among Black respondents, there is a null relationship between internal efficacy and reported pride ($p=0.85$). But reported racial group efficacy yields a strong and positive association with pride reported throughout the election ($p=0.000$).

The linkage between this measure of collective group efficacy and pride rather than anger for African Americans (yet *not* for White Americans) suggests there are racial bounds on the anger-agency linkage. Given the unique racial filters through which many African Americans interpret their political environment—which communicate salient messages regarding Black people's collective placement in the polity, and the general unresponsiveness to Black demands—it may be the case that in rare instances in which Black people feel agentic as a racial group, the corresponding emotional sentiment is not an indignant one of *I'm mad as hell*, but

rather an affirming one of *yes we can*.

The linkages between group efficacy and participation

The CMPS asks respondents whether they have participated in a variety of political actions over the past year. We ran a series of logistic regressions for Black and White respondents separately, predicting the influence of both efficacy measures on eight of these actions. Each regression model includes a standard battery of variables measuring demographic characteristics, socioeconomic resources, and indicators of political engagement—all standard in the civic voluntarism model of participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).[5] Here we simply compared the magnitude effects and standard errors for the respective efficacy measures. The results on each of these variables is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Logit regression models. Coefficient effects of internal and racial group efficacy on participation in eight political actions. Data from 2016 CMPS.

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Mtg	Work w/ Others	Contact	Protest	Boycott
WHITE								
Internal	0.02	0.30	0.06	*0.55^*	0.27	0.32	-0.28	0.47
Efficacy	(0.76)	(0.33)	(0.49)	*(0.32)*	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.31)
Racial	0.08	*0.78^*	-0.28	0.48	**0.81***	0.10	0.09	*0.60^*
Efficacy	(0.88)	*(0.40)*	(0.57)	(0.37)	**(0.37)**	(0.35)	(0.51)	*(0.35)*
BLACK								
Internal	0.35	0.15	-0.34	-0.03	0.18	-0.10	*-0.41^*	0.06
Efficacy	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.19)	(0.20)	*(0.23)*	(0.21)
Racial	*0.96^*	*0.49^*	**1.39***	0.32	**0.54***	**0.70**	-0.25	0.22
Efficacy	*(0.54)*	*(0.28)*	**(0.35)**	(0.24)	**(0.24)**	**(0.27)**	(0.29)	(0.28)

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

For both sets of subjects, internal efficacy is not widely predictive of political behavior. The magnitude effect of this measure manages to reach even one-tailed significance only once for each group—in the domain of attending a meeting addressing a local issue for White respondents (*p*=0.09), and in the domain of protest for African Americans (*p*=0.07). Notably,

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[5] Controls include: education attained, household income, age, gender (1=woman), party ID, frequency of r attendance, interest in politics, belief the economy worsened in the past year, and distrust in government. All variables are coded to range in value from zero to 1. Full model results available in Appendix.

greater internal efficacy is associated with a *lower* likelihood of protest participation for this group.

In contrast, the racial efficacy measure is significant at the 0.05 or 0.10 alpha levels for three activities for White respondents—donating to a campaign (p=0.05), working with others to address a problem (p=0.03), and participating in a boycott (p=0.09). Not surprisingly, racial efficacy is even more widely influential for Black respondents, exhibiting an effect on five of the eight actions that is distinguishable from zero at the 0.10 alpha level: voting (p=0.08), donating to a campaign (p=0.09), volunteering for a campaign (p=0.000), working with others to address a problem (p=0.03), and contacting an elected official (p=0.009). These patterns indicate perceptions of collective racial group efficacy carry greater leverage in shaping decisions to participate than perceptions of internal efficacy—especially for African Americans.

To compare the relative effects of these efficacy measures on subject participation in the RAP Study, we split the respective Black and White samples into two groups—those who report the non-efficacious or ambivalent response, and those who report the affirmatively efficacious response. Because both efficacy variables are five category measures, the samples are consequently split between those who report one of the first three categories, and those who report one of the final two categories. Thus, for the individual external efficacy measure, those who report *disagree strongly, disagree somewhat,* or *neither agree nor disagree* are placed in the "inefficacious" group, while those who report either *agree somewhat* or *agree strongly* are placed in the "efficacious" group. And for the racial group efficacy measure, those who report *never*, *rarely,* or *about half the time* are placed in the "inefficacious" group, while those who report either *most of the time* or *all of the time* are placed in the "efficacious" group.

We compare the means across the "inefficacious" and "efficacious" groups on three

measures of prospective participation—requesting information on an upcoming local town hall meeting, requesting information on a local policing forum expected to draw activists, and stated intention to vote in the 2018 election. Because the racial efficacy questions are post-treatment, we limit the mean comparisons to Black and White subjects in the control conditions. We intend here to compare only how individual and collective measures of efficacy influence intentions to take up political action. Table 9 below displays the mean comparisons for the conventional external efficacy measure.

Table 9: Mean intent to participate, across individual-level efficacy and subject race

		MIDTERM					TOWN HALL					POLICING FORUM			
		Ineff. n=78	Eff n=77	t-value	df		Ineff. n=78	Eff n=77	t-value	df		Ineff. n=78	Eff n=77	t-value	df
Black															
	M	0.76	0.87	-1.50**	153	M	0.53	0.62	-1.22	153	M	0.49	0.57	-1.05	153
	SD	(0.29)	(0.24)			SD	(0.50)	(0.49)			SD	(0.50)	(0.50)		
		Ineff. n=96	Eff n=47	t-value	df		Ineff. n=96	Eff n=47	t-value	df		Ineff. n=96	Eff n=47	t-value	df
White															
	M	0.90	0.96	-1.63^	141	M	0.50	0.57	-0.83	141	M	0.35	0.40	-0.58	141
	SD	(0.23)	(0.13)			SD	(0.50)	(0.50)			SD	(0.48)	(0.50)		

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Among both Black and White subjects, the difference in mean likelihood of participation between those who are efficacious and those who are not is only distinguishable from zero in the domain of voting. Perceiving political agency as an individual makes Black subjects (p=0.007) and White subjects (p=0.053) significantly more likely to vote. But the impact of individual efficacy is not as strong in the more communal and direct forms of participation.

Turning to the mean comparisons across racial group efficacy (shown in Table 10), a racially divergent pattern emerges.

Table 10: Mean intent to participate, across racial group efficacy and subject race. Data from 2018 RAP Study

		MIDTERM					TOWN HALL					POLICING FORUM			
		Ineff. n=114	Eff n=42	t-value	df		Ineff. n=114	Eff n=42	t-value	df		Ineff. n=114	Eff n=42	t-value	df
Black															
	M	0.80	0.86	-1.11	154	M	0.54	0.67	-1.38^	154	M	0.49	0.62	-1.42^	154
	SD	(0.28)	(0.25)			SD	(0.50)	(0.48)			SD	(0.50)	(0.49)		
		Ineff. n=83	Eff n=61	t-value	df		Ineff. n=83	Eff n=61	t-value	df		Ineff. n=83	Eff n=61	t-value	df
White															
	M	0.90	0.95	-1.43^	142	M	0.49	0.56	-0.75	142	M	0.33	0.43	-1.24	142
	SD	(0.23)	(0.15)			SD	(0.50)	(0.50)			SD	(0.47)	(0.50)		

^ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Among White subjects, racial group efficacy exhibits the same effects as the individual measure, increasing the propensity to vote in the midterm election (p=0.09), while not influencing participation in the other domains. Among Black subjects, however, racial efficacy increases the likelihoods of requesting information on both the local town hall (p=0.09) and policing forums (p=0.08). Whereas the CMPS study revealed racial group efficacy to influence participation in a broader range of political actions for Black respondents than Whites, here we find racial group efficacy influencing Black participation in a domain altogether different from that in which it influences White action. Specifically, Black subjects' senses of racial group efficacy appear to promote greater participation in costly, communal actions that entail direct engagement with various sets of institutional elites.

Summarizing the findings

Across both studies, African Americans exhibit significantly less racial group efficacy than White Americans. And whereas Whites exhibit more efficacy as a racial group than as individuals, Black people exhibit the opposite pattern. Contrary to extant literature, a clear linkage between efficacy and expressed anger was only present for White in one instance, as exposure to the racial anger prime increased White subjects' reports of racial group efficacy. For

African Americans, racial group efficacy either produced null or negative associations with expressed anger. Black individuals' racial group efficacy was in fact linked to the positive emotion state of pride. Finally, for both Black and White respondents—yet more so for African Americans—racial group efficacy was a stronger predictor of an array of political actions than either the conventional internal or external efficacy measures.

Discussion and Conclusion

An admittedly preliminary assessment of trends from the 2016 CMPS and 2018 RAP Study raises some interesting patterns, while surfacing key questions that must be answered to better understand how the beliefs that Black and White people hold about their belonging in politics shape how they feel and act their way through political cues. Future explorations of political behavior across different racial (or religious, or gender, or ideological, etc.) groups would be well served to consider both how people perceive their influence as individuals *and* as members of socially relevant groups.

Scrutinizing the role of perceptions of collective agency in political behavior can fine tune our understanding of why participation disparities across social groups remain intact even as some of the traditional cleavages, such as disparities in possession of socioeconomic resources, are reduced in the aggregate. Additionally, such a focus may illuminate the systematic variations in the emotions leveraged by groups to mobilize political action. While anger may be the most effective emotion to mobilize White Americans to stave off potential threats to their dominance in a racially hegemonic sociopolitical order, groups occupying lower rungs within that order may be mobilized more effectively by positive emotions propelling efforts to disrupt or transform the racial hierarchy. How are such positive emotions activated by a sense of collective group agency,

in a manner analogous to how action-mobilizing anger among White Americans has been shown to be animated by individual-level agency?

Whereas African Americans tend to express confidence in their efficacy as individuals that is comparable to Whites, they are much less optimistic about the agency they hold collectively as a racial group. It remains to be seen how this sense of agency varies across political contexts (i.e. one's neighborhood versus their state of residence, versus the nation), the political issues at stake, and the individual Black people making the calculation (i.e. those holding relatively privileged positions within the groups, such as middle class Christian men, opposed to those holding relatively marginalized positions, such as young queer women).

What are the specific action domains in which collective efficacy is most and least effective at influencing participation? How manipulable or effectively primed are people's perceptions of collective group efficacy? Would collective efficacy along lines of gender, age, sexuality, religion, region be as observable or influential as racial group efficacy? What does the emotion-efficacy linkage look like when extended beyond the Black-White binary?

As this project advances, we aim to provide insight on these questions while building on the emergent scholarship illustrating how group-based emotions vary systematically across racial groups in their emergence and translation toward political behavior (e.g. Banks, White and McKenzie 2018; Burge 2014; Philpot, White, Wylie and McGowen 2010; Phoenix and Arora 2018). Whereas the socioeconomic resources people possess or their underlying ideological views may not vary greatly from one political context to another, their sense of political influence and consequent emotional responses carry great potential variation. An understanding, therefore, of how race shapes how people feel and act their way through politics can offer great insight into dynamic changes in political behavior.

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Table A1: Effects of Internal and Collective Agency on White CMPS participants' likelihood of participation

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Mtg	Work w/ Ot~s	Contact Of~s	Protest	Boycott
Internal Efficacy	0.02	0.30	0.06	0.55	0.27	0.32	-0.28	0.47
	(0.76)	(0.33)	(0.49)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.44)	(0.31)
Collective Efficacy	0.08	0.78	-0.28	0.48	0.81*	0.10	0.09	0.60
	(0.88)	(0.40)	(0.57)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.35)
Education	1.70	0.94*	1.64**	1.40***	1.20**	1.34***	1.91***	1.45***
	(0.90)	(0.41)	(0.63)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.57)	(0.37)
Household Income	0.83	0.99**	-0.40	0.66*	0.22	0.70*	0.20	0.06
	(0.70)	(0.33)	(0.48)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.44)	(0.29)
Age	3.20*	0.56	-1.37	0.67	0.59	1.64**	-3.95***	-0.33
	(1.37)	(0.58)	(0.84)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.51)	(0.84)	(0.53)
Woman	0.15	0.06	-0.11	-0.26	-0.02	0.03	-0.17	0.24
	(0.42)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.18)
Party ID	0.92	0.43	0.91*	0.43	0.52*	0.16	1.02**	0.53*
	(0.60)	(0.26)	(0.39)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.24)
Church Attendance	0.32	-0.31	0.25	0.86***	0.53*	0.00	0.20	-0.03
	(0.58)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.24)
Interest in Politics	1.87*	3.32***	3.38***	1.57***	1.49***	2.41***	3.01***	2.21***
	(0.80)	(0.47)	(0.73)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.63)	(0.39)
Belief Economy Worsened	-0.48	-0.34	-0.52	-0.53	-0.44	-0.15	-0.70	-0.07
	(0.71)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.29)
Distrust in Government	0.20	-0.68	-1.73**	-0.21	0.36	0.15	0.25	1.00*
	(1.05)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.44)
Constant	-1.69	-5.35***	-4.41***	-4.39***	-4.49***	-4.85***	-4.34***	-5.05***
	(1.41)	(0.68)	(0.96)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.87)	(0.61)

Table A2: Effects of Internal and Collective Agency on Black CMPS participants' likelihood of participation

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Mtg	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Internal Efficacy	0.35	0.15	-0.34	-0.03	0.18	-0.10	-0.41	0.06
	(0.40)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Collective Efficacy	0.96	0.49	1.39***	0.32	0.54*	0.70**	-0.25	0.22
	(0.54)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.28)
Education	1.50**	0.34	0.40	0.38	0.45	1.07***	0.17	0.95***
	(0.52)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.25)
Household Income	1.33**	0.66**	0.64*	0.25	0.27	0.43*	0.41	1.15***
	(0.47)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Age	4.08***	0.74	0.23	-0.80*	-1.37***	1.31***	-3.36***	-2.02***
	(0.86)	(0.41)	(0.54)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.42)
Woman	0.22	-0.11	-0.10	-0.25*	-0.27*	-0.20	-0.10	0.18
	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Party ID	1.06*	0.40	-0.52	0.05	-0.02	-0.48*	0.43	0.10
	(0.49)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.24)
Church Attendance	0.62*	0.57***	0.47*	1.08***	0.78***	0.16	0.42*	-0.19
	(0.31)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Interest in Politics	1.96***	2.66***	1.60***	1.63***	1.48***	2.12***	1.99***	1.96***
	(0.40)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Belief Economy Worsensed	-0.51	-0.15	-0.46	-0.43*	-0.43*	-0.21	-0.37	-0.01
	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Distrust in Government	0.55	-0.56*	-0.64	0.13	0.15	-0.32	-0.53	0.01
	(0.50)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Constant	-3.41***	-4.71***	-3.66***	-2.46***	-2.33***	-3.73***	-1.82***	-3.26***
	(0.83)	(0.46)	(0.54)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.42)

Full RAP Study Instrument & Treatment Primes

How old are you?
[Text entry]

What is the highest level of education you completed?
Grades 1 – 8
Some High School
High School graduate or GED
Some college, 2-year degree
4-year college graduate
Post-graduate education

Gender
Female
Male
Other

Race / Ethnicity
White, not-Hispanic
Black or African American, not-Hispanic
Other

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
Agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

Public officials care about what people like me think.
Agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

People like me have a say in how government handles important issues.
Agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

I often trust government to make fair decisions on important issues.

Agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

How important is being white to your identity?
Extremely important
Very important
Moderately important
A little important
Not important at all

Do whites as a group have too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence in American politics?
Too much influence
Just the right amount of influence
Too little influence

How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?
Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not likely at all

Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?
Yes
No

[If yes to linked fate] Will it affect you:
A Lot
Some
Not Very Much

Which is more important, being: black, both black and American, or American?
Black
Both black and American
American

Do blacks as a group have too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence in American life and politics?
Too much influence
Just the right amount of influence

Too little influence

To have power and improve their position in the United States, Black people should be more active in black organizations.
Strongly agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.

Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
[For all]
Agree strongly
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

America is a land of opportunity where racial minorities only need to work hard to succeed.

Dealing with racial discrimination is a constant source of stress for me.

No matter how much racial progress is made, discrimination will always affect the lives of black people.

I feel a responsibility to my racial group to stay calm in the face of discrimination.
[For all]
Strongly agree
Agree somewhat
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree somewhat
Disagree strongly

*********************TREATMENTS*********************

[POLITICAL ANGER PRIME]

Above is a picture of angry constituents confronting public officials at a local town hall. Many people on both sides of the aisle have expressed anger over a political system that they believe is corrupt and ignores their needs. We would like you to take two minutes to describe in general things that make you feel angry about politics. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what it is that makes you angry and what it feels like to be angry about politics. Please describe the events that make you feel the angriest about politics.
[Text entry]

[RACIAL ANGER PRIME]

Above is a picture of angry activists confronting police officers at a local protest. Many people on both sides of the issue have expressed anger over recent controversies involving police and treatment of racial minorities. We would like you to take one minute to describe things in general that make you feel angry about racial controversies like policing. It is okay if you don't

remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you angry and what it feels like to be angry about racial issues. Please describe the events that make you feel the angriest about racial issues.
[Text entry]

[CONTROL][6]

Above is a picture of an empty suitcase. Many people take some kind of vacation during the summer. We would like you to take one minute to describe things in general that you would pack on a week-long vacation to a destination of your choice. It is okay if you don't remember everything to pack, just be specific about what comes to mind when you are packing for a vacation.
[TEXT ENTRY]

At the conclusion of this survey, would you like to sign your name to any of the letters being sent to your state legislator on in support of the following groups?
American Civil Liberties Union
Black Lives Matter
Fraternal Order of Police
Tea Party Patriots

There is an upcoming major town hall event with public officials in your local area. At the conclusion of this survey, would you like to receive information on how to attend this event?
Yes
No

There is an upcoming community forum on policing of minorities in your local area that is expected to draw activists on both sides. At the conclusion of this survey, would you like to receive information on how to attend this event?
Yes
No

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[6] Adapted from Cehajic-Clancy et al 2011

In the next year, how likely are you to donate money to:
A Republican candidate or campaign
A Democratic candidate or campaign
A local chapter of Black Lives Matter
A local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police
A local chapter of the Tea Party
[For all]
Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not likely at all

In the next year, how likely are you to volunteer for:
A Republican candidate or campaign
A Democratic candidate or campaign
A local chapter of Black Lives Matter
A local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police
A local chapter of the Tea Party
[For all]
Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not likely at all

In the next year, how likely are you to write an internet post in support of:
A Republican candidate or campaign
A Democratic candidate or campaign
A local chapter of Black Lives Matter
A local chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police
A local chapter of the Tea Party
[For all]
Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not likely at all

How often would you say public officials work hard to help [Black/White people]?

How often would you say [Black/White people] have a say in how government handles important issues?

How often would you say [Black/White people] elected to office can make changes for people in your racial group?
[For all]
All the time
Most of the time
About half of the time
Rarely
Never

How often during a typical week do you watch, listen to, or read the political news from any source (whether it is television, radio, the Internet or a newspaper)?
Multiple times each day
About once daily
A few times per week
About once per week
Never

Please indicate the party label that best reflects you:
Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent, Leaning Democrat
Independent
Independent, Leaning Republican
Republican
Strong Republican
Other (please specify): _____

How often would you say you attend a church or religious service?
Once or more per week
Nearly every week
Once or twice a month
A few times a year
Never